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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1611
___________
MARTIN A. ARMSTRONG,
Appellant
v.
JEFF GRONDOLSKY, WARDEN; SCOTT DODRILL,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR BOP PHILADELPHIA
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. N.J. Civil No. 08-cv-00569)
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect
or Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or for Summary Action Pursuant to Third
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 5, 2008
Before:

MCKEE, RENDELL AND SMITH, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: August 20, 2008
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
Martin Armstrong, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his motion to stay

the execution of his criminal sentence, or in the alternative, to grant bail, and his motion
for immediate change in custody to home confinement. We will affirm the order of the
District Court.
In 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission brought a civil securities fraud action against Armstrong. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held Armstrong in
civil contempt for failing to turn over records and assets to a court-appointed receiver. In
2004, Armstrong filed a habeas petition challenging his confinement for civil contempt.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of habeas relief. Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 486 (2007).
Armstrong was also criminally prosecuted for securities fraud. He pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to defraud the United States. In 2007, Armstrong received a 60-month
prison sentence, which would begin when the civil contempt matter was resolved. Before
he was sentenced, Armstrong unsuccessfully sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief to credit the time he spent in jail for civil contempt against his criminal
sentence.
Armstrong’s civil contempt order was then vacated, and he began serving his
criminal sentence in Fort Dix, New Jersey. In January 2008, he filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Armstrong claims, among other things, that he is entitled
to credit against his criminal sentence for the time he spent in prison for civil contempt,
that he was wrongfully confined for civil contempt, and that he was assaulted in prison
during his confinement for civil contempt. Armstrong also filed various motions,
including a motion for a change in custody to home confinement, and a motion to stay the
execution of his criminal sentence, or, in the alternative, to grant bail, pending the
conclusion of the habeas proceedings.
The District Court found that the civil contempt order was vacated on April 27,
2007, and that Armstrong began serving his 60-month criminal sentence on that date.
Because Armstrong was no longer in custody for civil contempt, the District Court
dismissed Armstrong’s habeas claims related to the civil contempt order. The District
Court also dismissed Armstrong’s claims for damages and injunctive relief under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971),
explaining that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Armstrong was required to
pursue his claims in a separate civil action.1
The District Court ordered Armstrong’s present custodian, Warden Jeff
Grondolsky, to respond to Armstrong’s allegation that he is entitled to receive credit
against his criminal sentence for the time spent in prison for civil contempt. The District

1

The District Court also questioned whether the District of New Jersey was the proper
venue for civil claims arising out of Armstrong’s confinement in New York for civil
contempt.
3

Court denied Armstrong’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling such credit because
Armstrong had an available remedy pursuant to § 2241. Finally, the District Court denied
Armstrong’s motions, including his motion for a change in custody to home confinement
and his motion to stay the execution of the criminal sentence, or, alternatively, to grant
bail pending the conclusion of his habeas proceedings.
Armstrong filed a notice of appeal limited to the District Court’s denial of bail or
an order staying the execution of his sentence, or a change in custody to home
confinement. We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review an order
denying a motion for release on bail pending the resolution of a habeas petition. United
States v. Smith, 835 F.2d 1048, 1049 (3d Cir. 1987). Similarly, we have jurisdiction to
review the District Court’s denial of a stay of execution of sentence and a change in
custody to home confinement under the collateral order doctrine, as these rulings are also
severable from the merits, conclusively determine the disputed question, and are
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See id.
As recognized by the District Court, the standards governing stays of civil
judgments guide courts in determining whether to release a federal prisoner seeking bail
pending disposition of a habeas petition. Id. at 1050. These standards include the
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, injury to other parties interested in
the proceeding, and the public interest. Id. Armstrong did not make a “strong showing
that he is likely to succeed on the merits.” Id. Armstrong argued that he was wrongfully
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held in civil contempt, and thus the Bureau of Prisons was required to credit his criminal
sentence with the time he served for civil contempt. Armstrong’s challenge to his
confinement for civil contempt, however, was unsuccessful. The District Court did not
err in denying Armstrong’s motion to stay the execution of his criminal sentence or to
grant bail.2
We also find no error in the District Court’s denial of Armstrong’s motion to
change his custody to home confinement. Armstrong alleged that home confinement was
necessary so that he could access documents relevant to his habeas petition, and so that he
could obtain needed dental care. The District Court explained that the only remaining
issue in the habeas proceeding was whether Armstrong is entitled to credit against his
criminal sentence for the time he spent in prison for civil contempt. The District Court
noted that this claim rests in large part upon issues of statutory construction, and that the
Warden would be ordered to produce the relevant portions of the record. We also agree
with the District Court that Armstrong may pursue a civil rights action to the extent he
claims he is being deprived of dental care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
Armstrong further stated that home confinement would enable him to care for his elderly

2

A state prisoner seeking habeas relief must show extraordinary circumstances
warranting bail. Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1240 (3d Cir. 1992). In Landano,
we noted that the standard applied in Smith was arguably more liberal toward release
from custody than warranted. Id. at 1239 n.19. Because Armstrong does not satisfy the
more liberal standard in Smith, we need not decide whether he was required to show
extraordinary circumstances.
5

mother. Home confinement is not warranted on this basis.3
Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will
affirm the order of the District Court.4
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Armstrong also appeals the denial of his motion for work release, which was
contained in his motion for a stay of execution of his criminal sentence. Although the
District Court did not expressly address this motion in its opinion, Armstrong has not
shown that he has a colorable claim of entitlement to work release.
4

All of Armstrong’s outstanding motions are denied.
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